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411 
READING THE TEA LEAVES: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF COALITION 
DISTRICTS UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE  
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years, state legislatures or specially designated commissions
1
 
convene to redraw legislative district lines that comport with new census 
data
2
 in a process known as redistricting.
3
 It is from these districts that 
members of the House of Representatives, state legislatures, and many city 
councils are elected.
4
 The law that emanates from these legislative bodies 
impacts nearly every aspect of life.
5
 Thus, the manner in which legislative 
districts are drawn has far reaching implications. They may profoundly 
impact the composition of the body politic
6
 which, in turn, informs the 
 
 
 1. In the majority of states, legislative districts are drawn by state legislatures themselves. See 
National Overview of Redistricting: Who draws the lines?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 1, 
2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-overview-redistricting-who-draws-lines. In 
seven states, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, “politician 
commissions,” in which elected officials may serve as members, draw districts. Id. In recent years, 
however, because of concerns over stark political gerrymandering to protect incumbents or particular 
political parties, there has been a trend towards establishing independent districting commissions. See 
Redistricting Reform, REDRAWING THE LINES, http://www.redrawingthelines.org/redistrictingreform 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2013). Such independent districting commissions draw the district lines in six 
states: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, and Washington. National Overview of 
Redistricting, supra.  
 2. The Constitution mandates that a census be conducted every ten years. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 2, cl. 3. As a result, the population and composition of each voting district can be ascertained by 
reference to the census data.  
 3. See Justin Levitt, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 1, 25 
(2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/7182a7e7624ed5265d_6im622teh.pdf.  
 4. Redistricting 101, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.brennancenter 
.org/analysis/redistricting-101. 
 5. Among other things, statutes establish welfare, social security and other government 
assistance programs, tax the citizenry, regulate the economy and the environment, establish the rules 
governing labor relations, set standards and obligations governing the safety and health of workers, 
consumers, and the general public, govern marital rights and obligations, and create property rights. 
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3–4 (3d ed. 2009).  
 6. Redistricting is an inherently political process. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973). In Gaffney, the Supreme Court noted: 
It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of districts may 
well determine the political complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral 
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or 
predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents 
against one another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced legislator. The 
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policies that ensuing legislators pursue and enact.
7
  
It is therefore of paramount importance that districts are drawn to 
ensure that all citizens have an equal opportunity to elect representatives 
of their choice. In order to make certain that each vote is of equal weight, 
the Constitution requires that redistricting plans be drawn as consistently 
populated, namely, that all legislative districts have the same population 
size.
8
 This bedrock principle is known as “one person, one vote.”9 
Redistricting plans must also comport with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
as amended, which safeguards minority voting strength.
10
 Both federal and 
state courts are available as forums in which to challenge a redistricting 
plan that does not comply with the mandates of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution
11
 and/or the Voting Rights Act.
12
  
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires the creation of districts for 
protected racial and language minorities that do not dilute their voting 
 
 
reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences. 
Id. at 753. 
 7. See Redistricting 101, supra note 4.  
 8. In the case of congressional districts, the equal population requirement derives from Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution and mandates that “absolute population equality be the paramount 
objective of apportionment . . . .” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983). Therefore, a 
congressional districting plan will not pass constitutional muster if the population deviations among 
the districts could have been minimized or avoided by a good faith effort, unless each deviation is 
justified by legitimate state objectives. Id. at 730–31. On the other hand, the equal population 
requirement as regards state legislative districts, which is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, permits minor deviations from absolute population equality without 
justification by the state. Id. at 735. The Supreme Court has categorized deviations of under 10 percent 
as “minor” so that precise equality of population is not required in the construction of state legislative 
districts. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983). But see Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 
(N.D.Ga.) aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (invalidating state legislative redistricting plans with population 
deviations of less than 10 percent under the Fourteenth Amendment “one person, one vote” doctrine).  
 For a detailed discussion of the equality-of-population redistricting requirement, see Michael A. 
Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, “A Legislative Task”: Why Four Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, 
or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2005).  
 9. The “one person, one vote” principle was established through a series of Supreme Court 
decisions starting in the early 1960s. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (recognizing justiciability 
of redistricting cases); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that “the command of Art. I, § 2, that 
Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable 
one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”) (footnote omitted); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires that each 
vote have approximately equal weight in the context of state redistricting).  
 10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2012)). 
 11. E.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993). 
 12. See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982). 
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strength, provided certain criteria are met.
13
 These districts are commonly 
described as “majority-minority” districts.14 The failure to draw 
“majority-minority” districts for any of the protected race or language 
minorities is actionable under section 2.
15
 However, the circuit courts of 
appeals are split over the question whether section 2 requires the creation 
of coalition districts.
16
 Coalition districts are electoral districts for two 
minority groups each of which individually would not meet the criteria 
requiring the construction of a majority-minority district under section 2,
17
 
but which do meet those criteria when combined as a coalition.
18
 The 
Supreme Court has not been presented with a case that directly raises this 
issue. This Note will explore whether, and to what extent, coalition 
districts are required under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act—and 
correspondingly, whether, and to what extent, the failure to create such 
coalition districts constitutes a section 2 violation—in light of recent 
Supreme Court authority.
19
  
Part I provides a brief overview of the history of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act and the requirements that must be met to state a claim 
for vote dilution. Part II summarizes the split among the circuit courts of 
appeals on the issue of coalition districts. Part III discusses the trend in 
section 2 vote dilution claims exemplified in the recent Supreme Court 
cases of Bartlett v. Strickland
20
 and Perry v. Perez.
21
 Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the likely outcome of a Supreme Court contest over coalition 
districts in view of these recent Supreme Court decisions.   
 
 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
 14. The Supreme Court has defined majority-minority districts as “districts in which a majority 
of the population is a member of a specific [protected] minority group.” Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 
146, 149 (1993). 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); see also Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153–54.  
 16. Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 17. The circumstances under which the construction of a majority-minority district is required, 
and correspondingly under which the failure to construct a majority-minority district is actionable 
under section 2, are detailed in Part I.C of the text. 
 18. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (plurality opinion) (defining coalition district 
claims as those “in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s 
choice.”).  
 19. In 2009, in Bartlett, the Supreme Court addressed the closely related concept of crossover 
districts. Id. A recent Supreme Court case, Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam), raised 
coalition districts as an aside to the main issue of the case. 
 20. 556 U.S. 1. 
 21. 132 S. Ct. 934.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief History of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
African-Americans were granted suffrage with passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment
22
 in 1870.
23
 However, nearly a century later, 
African-Americans still remained disenfranchised in several states that 
used discriminatory “literacy tests and similar voting qualifications”24 as 
voting prerequisites.
25
 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to 
eliminate discriminatory election practices that obstructed 
African-Americans’ right to exercise their voting franchise.26 Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act was enacted with the intent to remediate these 
evils
27
 and complement the protections afforded under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.
28
 The provisions of section 2 are universal and apply to every 
jurisdiction that draws lines for election districts.
29
 Section 2 states: 
 (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section. 
 (b) A violation of [section 2] . . . is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances,
30
 it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
 
 
 22. The Fifteenth Amendment provides “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.  
 23. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966). 
 24. See id. at 315.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. For further discussion of the history of the Voting Rights Act, see History of Federal 
Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2013); see also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.  
 27. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308–15. 
 28. See U.S. Const. amend. XV. For a discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment, see generally City 
of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); see also Primary Documents in American History: The 
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/ 
program/bib/ourdocs/15thamendment.html#American (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).  
 29. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 18 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 30. For a discussion of the totality of the circumstances standard, see infra text accompanying 
note 35. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/4
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class of citizens protected by [section 2] in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
31
 
 
 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). While the Voting Rights Act is explicit that the number of minority 
districts need not be proportionate to the minority group’s population, section 2 nevertheless is in the 
nature of an affirmative action statute that requires enhancing minorities’ voting opportunities. See 
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 5, at 278–84.  
 This inherent conflict derives from a political compromise requiring the inclusion of the no 
proportionality requirement in order to secure the passage of the 1982 amendment. See id. In the 1980 
case of City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, the Supreme Court interpreted section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act as only prohibiting intentional discrimination on account of race. 446 U.S. at 73–74. As a result of 
lobbying by civil rights groups, a number of senators and congressmen offered an amendment to 
section 2 prohibiting any voting practice with a discriminatory result. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 5, at 
278–80. This amendment passed the House of Representatives, but was stalled in the Senate because 
of concerns that a “results” standard could be interpreted by the courts to mandate proportional 
representation. Id. at 279–84. A compromise added the language to the proposed amendment stating: 
“nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers 
equal to their proportion in the population.” Id. at 279. With this compromise language, the section 2 
amendment in question passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by the President. See 
Voting Rights Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2 (1982) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole), reprinted in 
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 5, at 282–84. For a further discussion of the 1982 amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act see infra text accompanying notes 34–35. 
 The compromise created an inherent tension within the statute as it simultaneously prescribes 
affirmative action while disavowing proportionality.  
The compromise did little more than . . . leav[e] to the courts the task of developing a 
principled way to distinguish illegal vote dilution from lost races; and to do so without 
depending so heavily upon the degree of minority success in elections that [the courts] make 
proportional representation—if not in name, in fact—the true rule. 
 League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 
1494, 1503 (5th Cir.1987) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 829 
F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).  
 This tension permeates section 2 voting rights jurisprudence even today. Compare United Jewish 
Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (finding no dilution of the white vote in 
light of the imperatives of the Voting Rights Act), with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) 
(acknowledging that, notwithstanding the Voting Rights Act, white voters have constitutional 
protections which are not trumped by the requirement to create majority-minority voting districts). In 
this regard it is to be noted that Shaw was a 5 to 4 decision. Shaw, 509 U.S. 630. The majority opinion 
in Shaw states:  
Nothing in the [United Jewish Organizations] decision precludes white voters . . . from 
bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts 
on the basis of race without sufficient justification. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As originally enacted, the protections of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act extended exclusively to African-Americans who historically had 
suffered from discrimination with respect to their exercise of their right to 
vote.
32
 In 1975, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to broaden the 
protected class under section 2 to include the following language 
minorities: Native Americans, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and 
Hispanic Americans.
33
 In 1982, section 2 was further amended to clarify 
that it renders unlawful any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . which 
results in a denial or abridgement to the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”34 Under this discriminatory 
effects standard, a violation of section 2  
is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
35
 it is shown 
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the 
 
 
Id. at 652. By contrast, the dissenters believed that the facts of Shaw fit comfortably within the 
precedent set by United Jewish Organizations. Id. at 659. The dissent stated:  
[t]he Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. It does so by glossing 
over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly 
unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. 
Id.  
 32. See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring).  
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(e) (2006).  
 34. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 95 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 268 (emphasis 
added).  
 Prior to the 1982 amendment, the Act stated that “No . . . standard, practice, or procedure shall be 
imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color.” City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 
(1980). In City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, the Supreme Court construed this language to mean that 
proof of discriminatory intent was required to state a claim under section 2. Id. at 62. The purpose of 
the 1982 amendment was to legislatively overrule the holding in Mobile by  
mak[ing] clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of 
Section 2. It thereby restore[d] the legal standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court 
precedents, which applied in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation involved in 
Mobile v. Bolden.  
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179.  
 For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, see Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983); Katharine I. Butler & Richard 
Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a “Rainbow 
Coalition” Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 PAC. L.J. 619, 629–32 (1990); Richard 
A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the Revised 
Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1984).  
 35. In its report accompanying the 1982 amendment, The Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
identified factors for courts to consider in the “totality of the circumstances” analysis. See S. REP. NO. 
97-417. These include: (1) the degree of any history of any voting-related discrimination; (2) the 
extent of racial polarization in voting; (3) the extent to which procedures have been utilized which 
increase the opportunity for discrimination; (4) whether members of the minority group have been 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/4
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State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation 
by members of a class of citizens protected by . . . [the Act] in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.
36
 
B. Vote Dilution Under Section 2 
Section 2 bars any practice that dilutes the voting strength of protected 
minorities and, correspondingly, gives rise to a cause of action where vote 
dilution is found.
37
 Vote dilution exists where voting schemes “operate to 
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the 
voting population.”38 In redistricting, the “[d]ilution of racial minority 
group voting strength may be caused by the dispersal of [a protected 
minority group] into districts in which they constitute an ineffective 
minority of voters or from the concentration of [a protected minority 
group] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.”39 These 
two dilutive practices are commonly known as “cracking”40 and 
“packing,”41 respectively. “Cracking” dilutes minority voting strength 
because the minority group is divided “among various districts so that it is 
a majority in none.”42 Alternatively, when a redistricting plan “packs” 
minorities into a single district, minority voting strength is diluted 
because, but for the packing, the minority would have been able to elect 
more candidates of their choice.
43
  
 
 
denied access to the candidate slating process; (5) the extent to which minorities bear the effects of 
discrimination in education, employment, and health; (6) whether political campaigns include racial 
appeals; and (7) the success of members of the minority in achieving elective office. Id. at 28–29. 
Additional factors that may be probative were also included, namely, the degree of responsiveness to 
the minority group by elected officials and whether the policy underlying the voting practice is 
tenuous. Id. at 29. The Senate Report states that these factors are not exhaustive and that “there is no 
requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way 
or the other.” Id. This array of factors is drawn from Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 
1973), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), and commonly 
referred to as “the Zimmer factors.” See S. REP. NO. 97-417 at 23. The Supreme Court recognized the 
vitality of the Zimmer factors in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621–22 (1982). For a discussion of 
the contextual application of the totality of circumstances test, see infra text accompanying note 51. 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 37. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 38. Id. at 47 (quotation marks omitted).  
 39. Id. at 46 n.11.  
 40. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 41. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993). 
 42. Id. at 153. 
 43. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. The Gingles Preconditions: Establishing A Vote Dilution Claim Under 
Section 2  
In the seminal case of Thornburg v. Gingles,
44
 the Supreme Court, 
construing section 2, as amended in 1982, set forth three “necessary 
preconditions”45 (“the Gingles factors” or “the Gingles preconditions”) 
that a minority group must demonstrate in order to establish a claim for 
vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
46
 “First, the 
minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district.”47 “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is 
politically cohesive.”48 “Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate 
that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat 
the minority's preferred candidate.”49 It is only if these three preconditions 
are met
50
 that courts will look to the totality of the circumstances to 
determine “based ‘upon a searching practical evaluation of the “past and 
present reality,”’ . . . whether the political process is equally open to 
minority voters.”51 Under such circumstances, to avoid vote dilution, those 
who redistrict are required to create majority-minority districts
52
 to protect 
the minority’s ability to elect a candidate of its choice.53 Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act is silent on the matter of minority coalitions.
54
  
 
 
 44. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 45. Id. at 50–51. 
 46. The Gingles case arose in the context of multimember districts. Id. at 35. However, 
subsequent to Gingles, the Supreme Court held that the Gingles preconditions apply equally to section 
2 claims involving single member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). Single 
member districts are districts where “one candidate is elected to represent voters in the district. By 
contrast, in multimember districts, ‘two or more legislators [are] elected at large by the voters of the 
district.’” Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 426 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124, 127–28 (1971)). 
 47. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
 48. Id. at 51. 
 49. Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
 50. As the Fourth Circuit has observed, a minority group that does not satisfy all of the Gingles 
preconditions cannot demonstrate, as it must to state a claim under section 2, that it is the challenged 
electoral practice, as opposed to some other cause, that “impede[s] the ability of minority voters to 
elect representatives of their choice.” Hall, 385 F.3d at 426 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48).  
 51. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 (1982)). For a discussion 
of the circumstances that courts examine under the totality of the circumstances analysis, see supra 
text accompanying note 35.  
 52. For a definition of majority-minority districts, see supra text accompanying note 14. 
 53. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. 30.  
 54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006). In Nixon v. Kent County, the Sixth Circuit observed that the 
concept of minority coalitions is addressed only once—elsewhere in the Voting Rights Act—and in 
that case, in the negative. 76 F.3d 1381, 1387 n.7 (6th Cir. 1996). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/4
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II. COALITION DISTRICTS AND THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS 
The question has arisen whether impermissible dilution exists where 
two protected minority groups, each of which individually does not meet 
the Gingles preconditions, can be combined as a coalition and thus qualify 
for section 2 protection.
55
 Three circuits, the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the 
Sixth, have opined on this question.
56
 The Fifth Circuit
57
 and the Eleventh 
Circuit
58
 have found coalition districts to be actionable under section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, while the Sixth Circuit has taken the opposite 
view.
59
 Two other circuits, the Ninth
60
 and the Second,
61
 have implicitly 
 
 
(prohibiting the aggregation of language minorities for purposes of meeting the numerical 
requirements for foreign language ballots under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b).  
 55. The notion of coalition suits did not emerge until after the 1982 amendments to section 2 
when the intent test of Mobile was replaced with the totality of circumstances analysis under the 
Senate Report and Zimmer factors. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1387 n.8. Coalition districts were not even 
feasible until 1975, when the Voting Rights Act was broadened to extend its protections to minority 
groups other than African-Americans. Id. For discussions of coalition districts under section 2, see 
Butler & Murray, supra note 34, at 629–32; Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing 
Multiracial Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389; Chelsea J. 
Hopkins, Comment, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623 (2012); Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting 
Rights in the 21st Century and the California Voting Rights Act, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 183 
(2012); Aylon M. Schulte, Note, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: 
Toward Just Representation in Ethically Diverse Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441; Christopher 
E. Skinnell, Comment, Why Courts Should Forbid “Minority Coalition” Plaintiffs Under Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 363.  
 56. The Fourth Circuit has also spoken to the issue of coalition districts, albeit in the context of a 
case where the complaint alleged a violation of section 2 by reason of failure to draw a crossover 
district. Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of crossover districts, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 57. See Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), reh’g denied, 849 F.2d 
943 (1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
Council, No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other 
grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 58. See Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
 59. See Nixon, 76 F.3d 1381. The Fourth Circuit also has expressed the view that section 2 does 
not require the construction of coalition districts. See Hall, 385 F.3d 421.  
 60. In Badillo v. City of Stockton, Cal., 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992), the city changed the voting 
method for city council elections from single district to essentially at-large voting. Id. at 885. A 
coalition of African-American and Hispanic voters challenged this change under section 2, 
maintaining that it decreased minorities’ ability to elect their preferred candidates. Id. at 886. The 
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not establish the cohesiveness required by the second Gingles 
factor without addressing whether the coalition suit itself was permissible. Id. at 890. However, by 
undertaking a Gingles analysis, the Ninth Circuit tacitly acknowledged the existence of a section 2 
violation by reason of the failure to create a coalition district.  
 61. See Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 
1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994).  
 In Bridgeport, a group of African-American and Hispanic voters sought a preliminary injunction 
against the City of Bridgeport to prevent the implementation of a new redistricting plan. Id. at 272–73. 
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endorsed coalition claims so long as they satisfy the Gingles preconditions 
without specifically ruling on the question.
62
  
A. Recognition of Coalition Districts in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: 
Campos v. City of Baytown and Concerned Citizens of Hardee County 
v. Hardee Board of Commissioners  
In Campos v. City of Baytown, Texas,
63
 the Fifth Circuit squarely 
confronted the issue whether Hispanic and African-American citizens 
could be combined as one minority group for the purpose of establishing 
vote dilution under section 2. The majority of the Court determined that 
the failure to create such a coalition district could constitute a violation of 
section 2 provided the criteria for establishing vote dilution are met.
64
 The 
court reasoned that the Voting Rights Act protects “both racial and 
language minorities” and does not preclude aggregating protected 
minorities.
65
 It further observed that both racial and language minorities 
experienced similar historical discrimination in voting.
66
  
On petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Higginbotham issued a sharp 
dissent, in which five of his colleagues joined, taking the opposite view.
67
 
He criticized the majority’s assumption that a coalition of minorities is 
itself protected under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as an 
“unwarranted extension of congressional intent.”68 According to Judge 
 
 
The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s issuance of the injunction, finding that its decision that 
the coalition was likely to succeed on the merits was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 277. While the court 
was “persuaded . . . that there [was] more than sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the 
Coalition satisfied its burden imposed by Gingles,” it neither mentioned nor expressly addressed the 
issue of coalition districts. Id. at 275. 
 62. The Ninth and Second Circuit cases have been characterized by at least one court as “tacit 
recognition” of the viability of such an aggregation claim. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1384. The First Circuit 
took a position similar to that of the Ninth and Second Circuits in Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. 
v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986), but that authority is dubious inasmuch as the case was 
decided in early 1986, several months prior to the issuance of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gingles.  
 63. 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989). 
 64. Campos, 840 F.2d 1240. The court there stated “[i]f, together, they [African-Americans and 
Hispanics] are of such numbers residing geographically so as to constitute a majority in a single 
member district, they cross the Gingles threshold as potentially disadvantaged voters.” Id. at 1244.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 849 F.2d 943, 944–46 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting) (per curiam), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989). Eleven judges of the Fifth Circuit were 
polled as to the petition for rehearing in Campos (three judges did not participate in the poll). Id. at 
944. Although the six dissenting judges constituted a majority of the judges voting, the petition 
nevertheless was denied because a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service did not favor 
granting rehearing. Id.  
 68. Id. at 945. Judge Higginbotham took issue with the court’s statutory analysis of section 2, 
stating that “[t]he question is not whether Congress in the Voting Rights Act intended to prohibit such 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/4
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Higginbotham, coalition districts are outside the Gingles framework since 
“[i]ts three step inquiry assumes a group unified by race or national origin 
and asks if it is cohesive in its voting.”69 Judge Higginbotham asserted 
that, in his view,“[i]f a minority group lacks a common race or ethnicity, 
cohesion must rely principally on shared values, socio-economic factors, 
and coalition formation, making the group almost indistinguishable from 
political minorities as opposed to racial minorities.”70 Judge Higginbotham 
admonished the court for confusing “a cohesive voting minority with 
protected minorities who sometimes share similar political agendas.”71 
Thus, under Judge Higginbotham’s analysis, coalitions are simply interest 
groups seeking to maximize their political power and not the object of 
constitutionally impermissible discrimination.
72
  
 
 
coalitions; instead, the proper question is whether Congress intended to protect those coalitions.” Id. 
Judge Higginbotham first articulated this position in his dissenting opinion in League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). Midland was 
an action under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act initiated by a coalition of African-Americans and 
Mexican-Americans alleging dilution of their combined vote by an at-large system of electing the 
board of trustees for the Midland Independent School District. Midland, 812 F.2d at 1495. The 
majority opinion endorsed the aggregation of the African-American and Mexican-American voters for 
the purposes of applying the Gingles factors. Id. at 1501–02. In his dissent, Judge Higginbotham 
sounded the same theme on which he elaborates in Campos, namely, that permitting coalition claims is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act as this risks confusion of political coalitions, 
with little or no connection to discrimination, with a cohesive minority group sharing a common 
history of persistent bigotry. Id. at 1504 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).  
 69. Campos, 849 F.2d at 945 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. (quoting Higginbotham’s dissent in Midland, 812 F.2d at 1504). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Judge Higginbotham’s viewpoint was endorsed by his colleague on the Fifth Circuit, Judge 
Edith Jones, in her concurrence in League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. 
Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894–98 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring), in which four of her 
colleagues joined. Judge Jones stated, “I believe the . . . court should lay to rest the minority coalition 
theory of vote dilution claims. Id. at 894. Judge Jones offered a variety of reasons which, in her 
opinion, argue against aggregating racial and/or language minorities for purposes of a section 2 vote 
dilution claim.  
 Judge Jones opined that a textual analysis of the Voting Rights Act demonstrates that Congress 
did not intend to extend the section 2 protections against vote dilution to coalitions of different ethnic 
and language minorities. Id. She pointed to the 1975 amendment to the Voting Rights Act which 
extended section 2 protections to four additional distinct minorities. Id. Because each group was 
separately identified, Judge Jones concluded that “[b]y negative inference, Congress did not envision 
that each defined group might overlap with any of the others or with blacks.” Id. She observed that the 
1982 amendment to section 2 “likewise offers no textual support for a minority aggregation theory” as 
it refers only to a “class of citizens” and “a protected class” not “protected classes of citizens.” Id. 
Judge Jones also noted that coalition districts ignore the individual identity of each minority group and 
that aggregating minorities could result in the submergence of one minority group in a district 
dominated by a different minority and potentially lead to racial animosity. Id. at 896.  
 Lastly, in Judge Jones’ view, the recognition of coalition district suits under section 2 runs afoul 
of “the Section 2 prohibition of proportional representation” and would lead to the “possibly 
unconstitutional” remedy of “mandating proportional representation.” Id. This final argument has been 
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In Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee Board of 
Commissioners,
73
 African-American and Hispanic voters contended that 
the at-large system for electing the Hardee County Board of 
Commissioners (governing the county) and the Hardee County School 
Board violated section 2 by diluting the combined voting strength of 
African-Americans and Hispanics.
74
 The Eleventh Circuit, citing Campos 
and Midland without elaboration, found that “[t]wo minority groups . . . 
may be a single section 2 minority if they can establish that they behave in 
a politically cohesive manner.”75  
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Rejection of Coalition Districts: Nixon v. Kent 
County 
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Nixon v. Kent County,
76
 found that 
multiracial coalition districts are not covered by section 2, and held that 
the failure to create such districts does not give rise to a cognizable claim 
of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act.
77
 The court’s decision was 
informed by principles of statutory construction.
78
 The court reasoned that 
section 2 “does not mention minority coalitions, either expressly or 
conceptually . . . [and] consistently speaks of a ‘class’ in the singular.”79 It 
further noted that the legislative history lacks “evidence that Congress 
even contemplated coalition suits, far less intended them”80 as the 
committee reports for the 1975 and 1982 amendments did not “make any 
reference[s], implicit or explicit, to the issue of aggregation.”81  
The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by the Campos decision. Instead it 
“share[d] the concerns articulated by Judge Higginbotham in his dissent 
from the denial of rehearing.”82 Like Judge Higginbotham, the Sixth 
Circuit addressed, at length, policy concerns that underscored its 
 
 
criticized by at least one commentator who argues that while section 2 does not provide a right to 
proportional representation, nothing in the statute expressly prohibits it. See Schulte, supra note 55, at 
470. 
 73. 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 74. Id. at 525. 
 75. Id. at 526. 
 76. 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 77. Id. at 1393. 
 78. Id. at 1386. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 1387. However, the court pointed out that because the statute was clear it was 
“unnecessary and improper” to look to the legislative history. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1388. 
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conclusion.
83
 First, the court noted that based on historical discrimination, 
Congress had singled out select minorities for protection under the Voting 
Rights Act and that Congress made no finding of discrimination against 
multiracial coalitions.
84
 A finding of discrimination as to each group 
individually does not, in the Sixth Circuit’s view, afford a “basis for 
presuming such a finding regarding a group consisting of a mixture of 
both minorities.”85 In this regard, the court noted that the findings of 
discrimination as to African-Americans and the findings of discrimination 
against Hispanics were made years apart, and rested on different grounds, 
namely, “that African Americans had been disadvantaged specifically by 
reason of race, while Hispanic Americans had been disadvantaged by 
reason of language and education.”86 
Next, again citing Judge Higginbotham, the court noted that imposing a 
requirement to create coalition districts could lead to results that are 
contrary to the distinct interests of each group.
87
 The court was also 
concerned with the impact that requiring coalition districts would have 
upon those who draw district lines.
88
 It explained that those who redistrict 
would be confronted with the impossible task of having to choose whether 
to enhance minorities separately and subject the redistricting plan to the 
challenge that greater influence could have been achieved by creating 
coalition districts, or to create coalition districts, and subject themselves to 
the challenge that greater influence could have been achieved by creating 
individual minority districts.
89
  
Third, the court found that coalition districts fly in the face of the first 
Gingles precondition that the minority group be sufficiently numerous to 
constitute a majority in a single member district.
90
 Lastly, the court 
reiterated as “most persuasive[]”91 Judge Higginbotham’s observation that 
the joining together of protected minorities is animated by shared political 
interests, something the Voting Rights Act is not intended to protect.
92
  
 
 
 83. See id. at 1390–92. 
 84. Id. at 1390–91. 
 85. Id. at 1391 (citing to Judge Higginbotham’s dissent to the denial of a rehearing in Campos v. 
City of Baytown, Tex., 849 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989), as well as to Judge Jones’ concurring decision in League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 896 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., 
concurring)).  
 86. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1391–92. The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of coalition districts in Hall v. Virginia 
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision, however, was not unanimous. Judge 
Damon Keith authored a dissenting opinion in which he endorsed the 
position of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that nothing in section 2, as 
amended, precludes aggregated minorities from constituting a protected 
class.
93
 Judge Keith contended that section 2 should be construed liberally 
since it is a remedial statute.
94
 He expressed his view that the language of 
section 2 does not require racial homogeneity
95
 and that the majority’s 
imposition of such a racial classification is constitutionally 
impermissible.
96
 Finally, Judge Keith challenged the majority’s position 
that the combination of two minority groups would necessarily result in 
the submersion of each group’s legitimate political interests because 
section 2 protection is only afforded to groups whose interests are 
politically cohesive.
97
 Thus, in Judge Keith’s view, attempts to submerge 
divergent interests would not be tolerated under the Act.
98
  
III. COALITION DISTRICTS AND THE SUPREME COURT VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court, on more than one occasion, has declined the 
opportunity to opine directly on the question whether section 2 vote 
dilution is extant where a jurisdiction declines to draw a coalition district. 
Certiorari was sought and denied in Campos.
99
 While certiorari was 
granted in Bridgeport, the Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration 
 
 
likewise is informed by the notion that the banding together of disparate racial minorities is, at its core, 
political. Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2004). The court there stated: 
any construction of Section 2 that authorizes the vote dilution claims of multiracial coalitions 
would transform the Voting Rights Act from a law that removes disadvantages based on race, 
into one that creates advantages for political coalitions that are not so defined. “Congress 
enacted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act . . . to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee that no citizen’s right to vote shall ‘be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.’” 
Id. at 431 (alterations in original) (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152 (1993) (quoting 
U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1)).  
 93. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1396–97 (citing Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989) and Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee 
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990)).  
 94. Id. at 1397. 
 95. Id. at 1399. 
 96. Id. at 1399–1402. 
 97. Id. at 1402–03.  
 98. Id. at 1403. 
 99. 492 U.S. 905 (1989). 
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without addressing the issue of coalition districts.
100
 In Growe v. 
Emison,
101
 the Supreme Court declined to determine whether minority 
groups can be combined under section 2. Instead, the Court assumed 
without deciding that the failure to create a coalition district could 
constitute a violation of section 2.
102
 This was of no consequence in Growe 
because, in that case, the Court found that “the Gingles preconditions were 
. . . unattainable.”103 Although the Supreme Court has yet to squarely 
address coalition districts under section 2, the issue has arisen peripherally 
in recent cases.   
A. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Crossover Districts: Bartlett v. 
Strickland 
In Bartlett v. Strickland,
104
 a plurality opinion,
105
 the Supreme Court 
addressed the closely related concept of crossover districts.
106
 A crossover 
district, as the Court explained, is a district in which the “minority makes 
up less than a majority of the voting-age population, but is large enough to 
elect the candidate of its choice with help from majority voters who cross 
over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.”107 The Court observed 
that crossover districts can be regarded as a species of coalition districts 
because they also involve the aggregation of two groups—the protected 
 
 
 100. City of Bridgeport, Conn., v. Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994). 
 101. 507 U.S. 25 (1993). 
 102. Id. at 41. That the Supreme Court in Growe opted to assume the viability of coalition districts 
under section 2 without deciding the issue likely is of little predictive value. During that very same 
1992–1993 term, the Court was also presented with the related question of whether section 2 requires 
the creation of influence districts. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993). Influence districts 
are districts in which the minority has the ability to influence, but not determine, the electoral outcome. 
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003). In Voinovich, the Court chose to assume without 
deciding that section 2 protection extends to influence districts. Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 154. 
Nevertheless, when the Court was presented with an influence district case thirteen years later, it 
rejected the viability of influence districts under section 2. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). See infra text accompanying note 111. 
 103. Growe, 507 U.S. at 41. 
 104. 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 105. Justice Kennedy, in an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined, 
determined that section 2 is not violated by the failure to create a crossover district. Id. at 6, 23. Justice 
Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment on the ground that “the text 
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not authorize any vote dilution claim . . . .” Id. at 26 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, for varying reasons, five Justices agreed that section 2 does not 
mandate the creation of crossover districts.  
 106. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 3 (plurality opinion). For a law review article discussing the Bartlett 
decision, see Jacob Whitted, Comment, Bartlett v. Strickland: The Crossover of Race and Politics, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 581 (2010).  
 107. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 3 (plurality opinion).  
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minority and the white majority.
108
 However, the opinion is explicit that it 
is not directed to, and does not decide, the question whether the scope of 
section 2 vote dilution protection extends to multiracial coalition districts 
in which two protected minorities join together to form a coalition.
109
  
In Bartlett, the plurality determined that section 2 does not require the 
creation of crossover districts, and correspondingly, that the failure to 
create a crossover district is not actionable under section 2.
110
 The plurality 
opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, reasons that section 2 applies only 
when the minority has “less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to . . . elect representatives of their choice.”111 In crossover 
districts, the minority group does not have less opportunity because, 
standing alone, it does not constitute a majority capable of electing a 
candidate of its choice.
112
 Rather, in such circumstances, the minority 
group has the same “opportunity [as any other minority group within the 
electorate] to join other voters—including other racial minorities, or 
whites, or both—to reach a majority and elect their preferred 
candidate.”113 In other words, minorities constituting less than a majority 
need to form political coalitions in order to elect their candidate of 
choice.
114
 Affording minorities section 2 protection where the joinder of 
other groups is needed to elect a protected minority’s candidate of choice 
 
 
 108. Id. at 13.  
 109. Id. at 13–14 (explaining “[w]e do not address that type of coalition district here”). 
 110. Id. at 14–15. 
 111. Id. at 14 (alteration in original (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000 ed.)). Justice Kennedy 
relied on this same statutory language when he authored an opinion rejecting the sustainability of 
“influence districts” under section 2. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 
(2006). An influence district is one in which, by virtue of their number, “minority voters may not be 
able to elect a candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral 
process.” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003).  
 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, squarely rejected the notion 
that section 2 requires the creation of districts in which a protected minority group has the ability to 
influence, but not determine, the electoral outcome. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. 
at 443–47. Justice Kennedy cited the language of section 2 that requires that the protected minorities 
have the opportunity “to elect representatives of their choice,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, to opine that “the 
lack of such [influence] districts cannot establish a § 2 violation. The failure to create an influence 
district . . . does not run afoul of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 
548 U.S. at 446. He added, “If § 2 were interpreted to protect this kind of influence, it would 
unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.” Id.  
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the dismissal of the section 2 claim on the 
basis that no claim for vote dilution lies under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 512 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994)). 
Accordingly, they too would not recognize an influence district based vote dilution claim, albeit for 
reasons different than those articulated by Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito.  
 112. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
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would, in Justice Kennedy’s view, grant minorities an improper political 
advantage not contemplated by section 2.
115
 Reiterating the Court’s 
observation in Johnson v. De Grandy,
116
 the plurality opinion emphasized 
that “[m]inority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, 
and trade to find common political ground.”117 The opinion is clear that 
section 2 does not require districts to grant minorities “the most potential, 
or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting crossover voters.”118  
Justice Kennedy articulated another rationale—the need for workable 
standards for those who draw district lines.
119
 According to the plurality, 
adhering to the requirement that a minority must constitute fifty percent 
provides administrative certainty and simplicity
120
 while deviating from 
such a standard would require courts to delve into a host of nettlesome 
political inquiries concerning racial voting practices and patterns which 
courts are ill-suited to determine.
121
 Other reasons the Bartlett plurality 
expressed for maintaining the requirement that the minority population 
exceed fifty percent include the “special significance, in the democratic 
process, of a majority”122 and the fact that “§ 2 . . . is not concerned with 
maximizing minority voting strength.”123 
 
 
 115. Id. at 14–15, 20. “Nothing in §2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to form 
political coalitions.” Id. at 15. 
 116. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).  
 117. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 
1020 (1994)).  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 17. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. These include the percentage of white voters that supported minority preferred candidates, 
what types of candidates have minority voters and white voters historically supported together, what 
evidence indicates crossover support will continue, an examination of minority and white turnout rates, 
and what evidence supports that such turnout rates will remain the same. Id.  
 122. Id. at 19. 
 123. Id. at 23. By contrast, the dissent authored by Justice Souter argues that the plurality’s 
position, that the minority group must equal or exceed fifty percent of the district’s population, would 
force those who draw district lines to pack African-Americans into African-American districts thereby 
“contracting the number of districts where racial minorities are having success in transcending racial 
divisions in securing their preferred representation.” Id. at 27 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissenting 
opinion expressed concern regarding the adverse impact on racial harmony of the plurality’s decision. 
Id. The dissent admonished that the plurality’s view will effectively transform the objective of Voting 
Rights Act as it “will now be promoting racial blocs, and the role of race in districting decisions as a 
proxy for political identification will be heightened.” Id.  
 Justice Ginsburg, who joined in the dissent, also wrote separately to urge Congress to clarify the 
reach of section 2 in light of the plurality’s opinion. Id. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, 
while joining Justice Souter’s dissent, likewise authored a separate dissent in which he proposed 
revamping the fifty percent majority-within-a-district requirement under the first Gingles precondition. 
Id. at 44–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 Some commentators agree with Justice Breyer that the current Gingles analysis should be 
reconsidered, but suggest a different approach. Judge Strange of the Eleventh Circuit has advocated for 
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B. Perry v. Perez: Coalition Districts Receive a Notable Mention  
In a 2012 per curiam decision, Perry v. Perez,
124
 the Supreme Court 
took occasion to comment on coalition districts. The Perry case did not 
directly raise the question whether section 2 mandates the creation of 
coalition districts.
125
 Rather, the case involved the propriety of an interim 
redistricting plan drawn and ordered into effect by a three-judge district 
court pending preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of the 
congressional and state legislative plans enacted by the state of Texas.
126
 
The state of Texas argued that the court’s interim plans failed to pay due 
deference to the plans enacted by the state.
127
 One area of concern 
 
 
a preliminary inquiry before reaching the three Gingles preconditions. Rick G. Strange, Application of 
Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two or More Minority Groups—When Is The Whole 
Greater Than The Sum Of The Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95 (1989). That inquiry would focus on 
three factors: “[f]irst, whether the members of the aggregated group have similar socio-economic 
backgrounds; second, whether the members of the aggregated group have similar attitudes toward 
significant issues affecting the challenged entity; and third, whether the members of the aggregated 
group have consistently voted for the same candidates.” Id. at 129. If the three factors produce “the 
same or similar results” the minorities may be aggregated; if the results are different, then no 
aggregation would be permitted. Id. See also Butler & Murray, supra note 34, at 624 (arguing that 
aggregation is permissible only where the two minority groups can establish they are effectively one 
by showing “a common history of exclusion, that their political interests are so similar, and their past 
political behavior so uniform as to make the two groups one.”). 
 124. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012). 
 125. See id.  
 126. Id. at 940. Unlike section 2, which applies to all jurisdictions nationwide, section 5 addresses 
only those jurisdictions that fall under the rubric of section 4, commonly known as “covered 
jurisdictions.” Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/vot/misc/sec_4.php (last visited Aug. 4, 2013). In order for a covered jurisdiction to implement 
any electoral change, including implementing a new redistricting plan, section 5 mandates that it 
obtain approval or preclearance from the Attorney General of the United States or from a three-judge 
panel convened in the District of Columbia District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a)(2006). 
 As of 2012, Texas was a covered jurisdiction. However, on June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court 
held the existing coverage formula of section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. Shelby 
Cnty., Ala., v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Accordingly, as a practical matter, section 5 is no 
longer operative and under current circumstances, those jurisdictions previously covered under section 
5, including Texas, can implement electoral changes without the necessity for preclearance. For a 
discussion of Shelby County, see infra text accompanying note 159. 
 127. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 940–41. The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the primary 
responsibility for redistricting the Congress and the state legislatures lies with the states. See Chapman 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“We say once again what has been said on many occasions: 
reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other 
body, rather than of a federal court.”); accord Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (“[W]e renew 
our adherence to the principle[] [that] the Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for 
apportionment of their federal congressional and state legislative districts.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 
U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (“Federal courts are barred from intervening in state apportionment in the 
absence of a violation of federal law precisely because it is the domain of the States, and not the 
federal courts, to conduct apportionment in the first place.”); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 
(1977) (“We have repeatedly emphasized that ‘legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for 
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identified by the Perry Court was court-drawn Congressional District 
33.
128
 While the district court’s intentions in drawing District 33 were not 
entirely clear, its order suggested that the court “may have intentionally 
drawn District 33 as a ‘minority coalition opportunity district’ in which the 
court expected two different minority groups to band together to form an 
electoral majority.”129 Citing to Bartlett, with a “cf”, the Perry Court 
stated the following with respect to the lower court’s District 33: “If the 
District Court did set out to create a minority coalition district . . . it had no 
basis for doing so.”130 
IV. COALITION DISTRICTS IN THE WAKE OF BARTLETT AND PERRY 
In the aftermath of Bartlett and Perry, courts have evinced a difference 
of opinion as to whether the issue of coalition districts under section 2 has 
been resolved. In a footnote in Pope v. County of Albany,
131
 the Second 
Circuit, without referencing either Bartlett or Perry, indicated that the 
circuits are split on the question whether minorities can be aggregated to 
form a coalition district under section 2.
132
 By contrast, in Texas v. United 
States,
133
 a three-judge panel convened in the District of Columbia stated 
that Perry forecloses coalition districts under section 2.
134
  
 
 
legislative consideration and determination,’ for a state legislature is the institution that is by far the 
best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally 
mandated framework of substantial population equality.”) (citation and footnote omitted); White v. 
Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973) (“We have adhered to the view that state legislatures have ‘primary 
jurisdiction’ over legislative reapportionment.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) 
(“[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, 
and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to 
federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do 
so.”); see also Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) (per curiam).  
 Perry rests on this principle. As the Perry Court stated, the fact that a plan has not been 
pre-cleared and cannot be implemented “does not mean that the plan is of no account or that the policy 
judgments it reflects can be disregarded by a district court drawing an interim plan. On the contrary, 
the state plan serves as a starting point for the district court.” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 941.  
 128. Id. at 944. 
 129. Id. Alternatively, other parts of the order suggested that the district was drawn strictly by 
reason of population growth. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 132. Id. at 572 n.5. The Second Circuit continued to follow its own jurisprudence and accordingly, 
assumed without deciding that coalition districts are protected under section 2. See supra text 
accompanying note 61. 
 133. 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 
2885 (2013). 
 134. Id. at 149 (stating “Perez held only that the district court had no basis to draw a new coalition 
district under section 2”). The purpose of the three-judge court was to consider a request for 
preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 138–39. At issue was the question 
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Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Second Circuit is correct as 
a technical matter, namely, that the circuits are split on this question and 
that neither Bartlett nor Perry expressly resolved the split. In neither case 
was the question of coalition districts squarely before the Court.
135
 Bartlett 
contains only a brief discussion of coalition districts in which it provides a 
definition accompanied by citation to Nixon v. Kent, in order to eliminate 
any confusion between coalition districts and crossover districts.
136
 
Moreover, the plurality decision explicitly states: “[w]e do not address that 
type of coalition district [where two minority groups join] here.”137  
The three-judge panel in the District of Columbia interpreted an 
isolated statement in Perry—that the district court had no basis for 
creating a coalition district, accompanied by a “cf” to Bartlett—to be a 
holding that section 2 does not require the creation of coalition districts.
138
  
However, the Supreme Court’s previous treatment of this and similar 
issues suggests that it is unlikely that the Perry Court intended to resolve 
whether section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts in such a 
cryptic fashion.  
First, by assuming without deciding that coalition districts were 
permissible in Growe,
139
 and by severing coalition districts from its 
decision in Bartlett,
140
 the Court clearly has reserved the issue in two cases 
that it has decided. Such treatment indicates that the Court believes that 
the issue of coalition districts should not be given short shrift.  
 
 
whether the failure to maintain a preexisting coalition district constituted retrogression precluding 
section 5 preclearance. Id. at 139–40. It was in that context that the court made its statement regarding 
the status of coalition districts under section 2.  
 Retrogression is determined by measuring “the extent to which a new plan changes the minority 
group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 
(2003). A retrogression analysis involves comparing the new redistricting plan to the existing plan.  
 A proposed plan is retrogressive under Section 5 if its net effect would be to reduce 
minority voters’ “effective exercise of the electoral franchise” when compared to the 
benchmark plan. In 2006, Congress clarified that this means the jurisdiction must establish 
that its proposed redistricting plan will not have the effect of “diminishing the ability of any 
citizens of the United States” because of race, color, or membership in a language minority 
group defined in the Act, “to elect their preferred candidate of choice.” 
Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of The Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 7469, 
7471 (Feb. 9, 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).  
 135. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012). 
 136. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion) (explaining “[t]his Court has referred sometimes 
to crossover districts as ‘coalitional’ districts, in recognition of the necessary coalition between 
minority and crossover majority voters”). 
 137. Id. at 13–14. 
 138. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49; see supra text accompanying note 134134. 
 139. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993). 
 140. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13–14 (plurality opinion). 
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Second, Perry was a per curiam decision, namely, one in which all of 
the Justices were in agreement as to the result.
141
 Justice Thomas, who 
authored a concurrence, was the only Justice to write separately.
142
 
Strikingly, neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice Breyer dissented from the 
statement as to coalition districts, despite the fact that both so strongly 
opposed the plurality’s rejection of crossover districts in Bartlett that they 
not only joined the dissent,
143
 but also wrote separately to endorse it.
144
 It 
would be incongruous to expect that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, 
both of whom read section 2 to require crossover districts aggregating 
protected minorities and whites, would come out differently in the context 
of coalition districts, which aggregate two protected minority groups. 
Thus, the fact that neither Justice dissented as to the reference to coalition 
districts in Perry, suggests that they did not take the statement there to 
mean that the Court was extending the Bartlett holding to multiracial 
coalition districts.  
While perhaps not holdings with respect to coalition districts, Bartlett 
and Perry are nevertheless instructive. In Bartlett, the plurality framed the 
issue as whether a minority group that constitutes less than fifty percent 
can meet the first Gingles precondition.
145
 In this regard, a coalition 
district, which by definition comprises two minority groups each of which 
constitutes less than fifty percent, can never meet the first Gingles factor. 
The plurality decision explained that in a situation where the minority 
group constitutes less than fifty percent, the minority’s ability to elect a 
candidate of its choice is no different than that of other groups with equal 
voting strength since they “have the opportunity to join other voters—
including other racial minorities, or whites, or both—to reach a majority 
 
 
 141. See Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per 
Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1238 (2012) (explaining that the Court issues per curiam 
decisions where “the result is so obvious that no Justice feels the need to write separately”). 
 142. Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome of the Court’s decision—to vacate the interim 
redistricting map and remand the case to the District Court for the determination of the constitutional 
and section 2 challenges—but differed as to how the Court should have arrived at this result. See Perry 
v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 944–45 (2012). Specifically, Justice Thomas would have vacated the interim 
orders on the ground that section 5 is unconstitutional. Id. at 945. 
 143. Three Justices, Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, and Justice Ginsburg, joined Justice Souter’s 
dissenting opinion in Bartlett. 556 U.S. at 26–44 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, the composition of 
the Court changed between the Bartlett and Perry decisions. Justice Souter and Justice Stevens retired 
in 2009 and 2010, respectively, and thus did not participate in the Perry decision. Members of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2013). 
 144. Justice Ginsburg joined in what she characterized as a “powerfully persuasive dissenting 
opinion,” Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and Justice Breyer joined the dissenting 
“opinion in full.” Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 12 (plurality opinion). 
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and elect their preferred candidate.”146 Thus, although Bartlett does not 
decide coalition districts, by framing the aggregation as either with whites 
(as was the case in Bartlett) or with “other racial minorities,” the plurality 
decision gives a clear indication that the result would be no different if the 
case before it involved the creation of coalition districts as the reasoning 
would be the same.
147
 
Bartlett’s citation to Nixon is also telling. Bartlett explicitly states that 
it does not address coalition districts and uses Nixon as a citing reference 
for this proposition.
148
 Arguably, this could be attributed to the fact that 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Nixon is the most recent on the issue. 
However, more persuasive reasons suggest that in citing Nixon, the 
Bartlett plurality was implicitly ratifying the Nixon opinion and, because 
Nixon relies heavily on Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in Campos, 
discrediting the position of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
149
  
The principal rationales of the Bartlett plurality mirror many of the 
policy concerns with respect to extending protection to coalition districts 
that were articulated by Judge Higginbotham and echoed by the Sixth 
Circuit in Nixon.
150
 Bartlett, like the Sixth Circuit, appeared to be most 
concerned with the notion that requiring crossover districts would be 
tantamount to creating a district for a political interest group thereby 
bestowing upon protected minorities special privileges that exceed the 
scope of the Voting Rights Act.
151
 Moreover, both the plurality in Bartlett 
 
 
 146. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 147. Coalition districts, like crossover districts, require that another group of voters cross over to 
join with the minority for electoral success. The only difference is that with crossover districts, the 
group crossing over is the white majority, whereas in coalition districts it is another minority group 
that crosses over. 
 148. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13–14.  
 149. The Eleventh Circuit’s Concerned Citizens decision does not articulate a rationale for its 
decision but merely cites to the Campos decision of the Fifth Circuit. Concerned Citizens of Hardee 
Cnty. v. Hardee Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990). In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit 
implicitly adopted the arguments and reasoning of the Campos court when it determined that coalition 
districts were actionable under section 2. See Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F.2d 1240 (5th 
Cir.), reh’g denied, 849 F.2d 943 (1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989). 
 150. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15–19; Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1391–92 (6th Cir. 1996).  
 151. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14–15 (plurality opinion) (“Recognizing a § 2 claim in this circumstance 
would grant minority voters ‘a right to preserve their strength for the purposes of forging an 
advantageous political alliance.’ Nothing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to 
form political coalitions.”) (citations omitted); Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1391–92 (characterizing this as the 
“most persuasive[]” policy concern in support of its holding); See also Campos, 849 F.2d at 945 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (explaining “[a] group tied by overlapping political agendas but not tied 
by the same statutory disability is no more than a political alliance or coalition . . . [and expressing his] 
concern that so stretching the concept of cohesiveness dilutes its effectiveness as a measure of the 
causal relationship among the statutory disability, election structures or processes, and election 
outcomes”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2013] READING THE TEA LEAVES 433 
 
 
 
 
and the Sixth Circuit in Nixon express the need for clear redistricting 
standards and recognize that requiring crossover districts and coalition 
districts, respectively, would impose an arduous task on those who draw 
district lines.
152
 Bartlett and Nixon also share the concern that permitting a 
single minority group to join with another group to satisfy the first Gingles 
factor would render its numerosity requirement and consequently, the first 
Gingles factor itself, a nullity.
153
  
Accordingly, Perry’s “cf” reference to the Bartlett rationale might be 
better understood as suggesting that, although Bartlett involved crossover 
districts, the rationale of the case is not limited to that context. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, while Bartlett and Perry could be interpreted as resolving the 
circuit split, as the District Court for the District of Columbia did,
154
 the 
Supreme Court’s oblique references did not dissuade the Second Circuit 
from maintaining that the circuit split exists in the aftermath of Bartlett 
and Perry.
155
 Nevertheless, at the very least, these cases strongly suggest 
that if and when the issue of coalition districts is directly presented to the 
Supreme Court, the Court will hold that coalition districts do not come 
within the ambit of section 2. Such a holding, however, would not deliver 
an entirely fatal blow to coalition districts. Even though such districts 
would not be afforded protection under section 2, states and political 
subdivisions would be able to draw coalition districts voluntarily
156
 so 
long as the predominant reason for drawing coalition districts is not 
race.
157
 Further, at least one court has held that coalition districts are 
 
 
 152. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 18 (the “rule [requiring greater than 50% minority population] provides 
straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged with drawing district lines to comply 
with § 2”); Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1391 (stating “acceptance of the coalition district theory . . . would . . . 
serve to frustrate those who, in good faith, seek to draw district lines according to the Voting Rights 
Act’s nebulous requirements”). 
 153. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (explaining that “[a]llowing crossover-district claims would require 
[the Court] to revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of [the 
Court’s] § 2 jurisprudence); Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1391 (noting that the first Gingles precondition 
“recognizes that, in some cases, a minority will not be numerous enough to prove a violation . . . . 
Permitting coalition suits effectively eliminates this obstacle”).  
 154. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013). 
 155. Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit clearly was aware 
of the Bartlett decision as it is cited elsewhere in the opinion. Id. at 573 n.6, 574, 576, 577 n.9.  
 156. In Bartlett, Justice Kennedy explained that “§ 2 does not mandate creating or preserving 
crossover districts. . . . [but][s]tates that wish to draw crossover districts are free to do so where no 
other prohibition exists.” 556 U.S. at 23–24.  
 157. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (holding that, while race may be a factor, 
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implicated in the retrogression analysis for preclearance under section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act.
158
 As a practical matter, section 5 has been 
eviscerated in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, 
Alabama v. Holder,
159
 which invalidated the formula for selecting 
jurisdictions subject to section 5 coverage. Consequently, there are 
presently no jurisdictions as to which the preclearance requirement of 
section 5 is operative. Nonetheless, the prospect remains that in the future, 
jurisdictions will be subject to preclearance either through the enactment 
of a new, constitutional formula for section 5 coverage, or on a case-by-
case basis through litigation under section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.
160
 In 
that event, the prohibition against retrogression may preclude the 
elimination of coalition districts that already exist, unless there is a 
legitimate justification for doing so.
161
 As a corollary, if a jurisdiction 
 
 
it may not be the “predominant factor motivating the legislature’s districting decision”) (quotations 
omitted); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (holding that race may not be “the legislature’s 
dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 
(1993) (same).  
 By contrast, The Supreme Court has identified several legislative policies as legitimate 
redistricting objectives so long as they are applied consistently. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 
740 (1983). One such objective is drawing district lines in order to avoid pitting incumbents against 
one another. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (“recogniz[ing] incumbency protection, at 
least in the limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbent[s],’ as a legitimate state goal.”) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)); White v. Weiser, 412 
U.S. 783, 797 (1973) (“‘The fact that district boundaries may have been drawn in a way that 
minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents does not in and of itself establish 
invidiousness.’”) (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966)). Other legitimate state 
objectives include “making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, [and] preserving the 
cores of prior districts.” Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740.  
 158. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133. For a discussion of section 5, see supra text accompanying note 
126.  
 159. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act sets forth a formula by which 
those jurisdictions covered by section 5 are determined. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006). In Shelby 
County, the Supreme Court held the section 4(b) coverage formula, reauthorized by Congress in 2006, 
unconstitutional as it was not updated to reflect current voting conditions in the covered jurisdictions. 
133 S. Ct. at 2631. Instead, section 4(b) continued to be premised on conditions existing on November 
1, 1964, November 1, 1968, or November 1, 1972. Id. at 2619–21. As such, the Court found the 
formula to irrationally “differentiate[] between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the 
States enjoy equal sovereignty.” Id. at 2621 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 193, 203 (2009).  
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). Under section 3’s so-called “bail in mechanism” or “pocket 
trigger,” a federal court can render a jurisdiction subject to preclearance if it has violated the voting 
rights protections of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. For a detailed discussion of section 3, 
see Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and 
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010).  
 161. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 148–49. The District Court for the District of Columbia there 
explained that because section 5, unlike section 2, deals with retrogression and not vote dilution, the 
rationale of Bartlett does not militate against requiring the continuation of coalition districts under 
section 5: 
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subject to preclearance opts, as a matter of political choice, to create a 
coalition district, it might not be able to later dismantle that district 
without justification. 
However, until the Supreme Court addresses this question, the split 
among the circuit courts remains, as does the possibility that the split may 
expand to encompass other circuits and become further entrenched. The 
circuit split is particularly harmful because it presents the potential of 
divergent redistricting requirements, depending upon the circuit in which a 
state is situated. This inconsistency undermines the legitimacy of the 
electoral process and the legitimacy of the decision-making of elected 
officials since the same rules ought to apply nationwide. That such a 
question remains unresolved strikes directly at the heart of our democratic 
system and the nature of representative government as it exists in the 
United States.
162
 Thus, this is an area of the law that clearly calls for 
predictability, uniformity, and certainty.  
Notwithstanding the absence of direct Supreme Court authority, the 
Court has nevertheless left beacons to guide the lower courts. Its steadfast 
adherence to the majority-within-a-district requirement under the first 
Gingles precondition, as evidenced in its decisions regarding crossover 
districts and influence districts, as well as its admonition to the lower court 
in Perry, ineluctably point to the conclusion that, while coalition districts 
may be constructed as a matter of political choice, they are not required by 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the failure to create them does not 
give rise to a cause of action under that section. Therefore, because of the 
 
 
Part of the Court’s analysis [in Bartlett] rested on the difficulties of predicting whether a 
potential coalition would provide minorities with an opportunity to elect. Section 5, by 
contrast, asks whether an existing coalition has achieved an ability to elect. Section 5 does not 
call on us to guess the future, but to determine whether there is past evidence of a 
demonstrated ability to elect. And while section 2 does not demand granting “special 
protection to a minority group’s right to form political coalitions” or “impose on those who 
draw election districts a duty to give minority voters the most potential, or the best potential, 
to elect a candidate by attracting crossover voters,” section 5 mandates that we ensure that 
“the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation [are] not destroyed.”  
Id. at 149 (citations omitted) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).  
 162. Judge Higginbotham expressed this concern in his dissent in the petition for rehearing in 
Campos: 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gingles left undecided fundamental questions under the 
Voting Rights Act. Today we fail to give to protected minorities, district courts, state 
government, and the bar our best considered reading of the core meaning of legislation that 
speaks to the essence of our arrangements of governance. We can do better but if we will not, 
hopefully, the Supreme Court will do so. 
Campos v. Baytown, Tex., 946 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 
905 (1989). This concern still persists today, decades after it was first expressed by Judge 
Higginbotham in his 1988 Campos dissent.  
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need for consistency among the circuits, in the interim pending definitive 
resolution by the Supreme Court, those circuits that have yet to opine on 
the issue of coalition districts, should observe the spirit of Bartlett and 
Perry and decline to recognize a right to coalition districts under section 2. 
Similarly, those circuits that have recognized the viability of coalition 
districts under section 2 should revisit their jurisprudence in light of the 
Bartlett and Perry decisions. 
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